Imran Khan will not be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan (there, I’ve said it)

15 11 2011

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Imran Khan
Politics 101: NEVER DO THAT WITH YOUR ARM. Pakistani Politics 101: try to avoid making the Quaid-e-Azam look like the Psammead

It’s very easy to have a soft spot for Imran Khan; particularly if you’re British and know nothing about the subject. He invented reverse swing. He batted so stoically. He looked good in whites. He saved us the embarrassment of winning a world cup with Derek Pringle in the squad (and didn’t even gloat about it afterwards). He married the daughter of Britain’s favourite fascist*. He looks good in a suit. And apparently he’s some sort of liberal or something? Probably.

In many ways Khan is indicative of the overly simplistic attitude the west has to the politics of places they don’t like to visit. Find a solution (and only one) to all the nation’s problems in the form of a man who looks good in a suit, speaks good English, was educated in the west (the more Oxbridge, and therefore the posher and more out of touch, the better) and uses some correct buzzwords; then invest all your hope and energy in them. History is littered with vile little tin pot dictators who seemed very personable at mixers in Claridges. History has an even greater supply of complete non entities the public of country x didn’t even look at twice but who the west championed for years as the next big thing. Mustafa Barghouti’s 156,227 votes in the 2005 Palestinian Presidential election came at a price of something like $20 per vote of western wishful thinking.

Khan may be symptomatic of a general trend but there is not yet any evidence that he has any dictatorial tendencies. However, in the form of 15 years of electoral humiliation, there is every evidence that he was – until recently – an irrelevance and a joke. Yet as of last Wednesday (ish) suddenly the whole world is ringing with the news of the “incredible surge in PTI popularity“. But is it based upon anything other than western liberal wishful thinking and the self-affirming, self-fulfilling positive feedback cycle of all journalistic hype, “speculation mounts that” style stories?

To answer that I’d suggest we look at the opinion polls – except that there haven’t been any since July. Failing that I suggest that we look at recent election results – except that there haven’t been any for ages. Failing that I suggest that we look for any empirical evidence whatsoever to substantiate the claim – there was a rally in Lahore to which 70,000 attended which is quite impressive. Except that at a push I think I could get 70,000 to a rally in Lahore – Lahore has a population of nine million and there isn’t much to do in the evenings.

Ok, it’s not entirely media speculation. The substantive points are that there have been a number of high profile defections to the PTI within a couple of days of each other. There are a number of different types of defections going on here:

Firstly some impressive technocrats have joined; important but without political significance, albeit their defections were timed to perfection.

Secondly a lot of the PML-Q, PML-F etc… are lining up to join the PTI; this is more important in that it could give the PTI something it sorely lacks: numbers in Parliament. However it’s also not that surprising, the PML-Q are a disparate collection of vested interest groups – a King’s party whose King has died, they were always going to fragment and wash up on the shores of the party in whose direction the wind was blowing.

Thirdly, some genuinely heavy hitters from the PPP have joined the PTI. I’m not going to sniff at that, except to say that perhaps embittered former heavy hitters would be a better term. Even so it is impressive except in that in Pakistan this kind of thing happens all the time. A long long time ago Aftab Ahmad Sherpao wasn’t a joke.

Finally, and in conjunction presumably with the wooing of the PML-Q, we hear that several prominent landlords – including the Legharies of DG Khan - are thinking of joining. Given the political power of the Legharies that really isn’t to be sniffed at.

So what we actually have is a number of vested interest groups, feudal landlords and usual suspects flocking to a banner: partly – I imagine – because their rivals support Khan’s rivals and partly because they’ve made a self-fulfilling judgement that Khan and the PTI are going somewhere. What has actually changed is that Khan is willing to accept these people. Khan was once Mr Clean and Mr Pure, not to be sullied by the feudalism and patronage game the others all play. The real story of the last few days is that Khan has shown himself to be just another Pakistani politician.

I think that’s a mistake – he could bite hard into the main parties but he’s surrendered the one thing that made him unique to enter a game he cannot possibly win. He might get a few PML-Q dropouts and the odd landlord whose burnt so many bridges with both the PPP and the PML that they have nowhere else to go, but there is no way he can win a patronage game against the big two – they just have access to far more graft. I’m not alone.

But lets suppose he does win. When I was younger and more pretentious I used to tell people my favourite film was Novecento when it was actually Con Air. Novecento is however still a cracking film. Because I am still quite pretentious I’m now going to reinterpret it as a biopic of Imran Khan and Javed Miandad. Bear with me, I realise I’m pitching to a very narrow venn here.

Robert de Niro is Imran Khan: rich, handsome, he is given the world on a plate but he is determined to do good. Gérard Depardieu is Javed Miandad: poor and spectacularly grumpy but very talented he just wants to get his job done. They grow up together, sometimes they are best friends, sometimes they are worst enemies, always there is tension. Both are swept up in the arc of history,  it is Italy in the 1930s, one cannot get anything done without joining the fascists. A nutter tries to draw attention to the injustice of society by chopping off his own ear (that would be Afridi).

We are now just at the beginning of act 2. The evil Donald Sutherland (Mazhar Majeed?) and his grotesque lover (i’m going to say Ijaz Butt) have just raped and murdered a poor innocent child (Mohammed Amir) and headbutted a cat to death (err… Mohammed Asif?). Now Khan/de Niro must make a choice – become just another feudal landlord, join in with the prevailing mood of the time, join the fascists and hope in so doing to be able to protect the people living on his land, or take to the hills with Depardieu in the knowledge that he will not see power for many a year.

de Niro does what Khan seems about to do and becomes just another feudal landlord. But inevitably rather than changing the system, the system changes him and he becomes just another fascist. When the war ends Depardieu/Miandad puts him on trial; he insists he has done nothing wrong; on one level this is not disputed, but the villagers point out to him that if you know that the system is going to change you, if you know the system is going to make you one of them, then you shouldn’t participate in the system. The film ends with Depardieu and de Niro doing what Khan and Miandad will inevitably do: living out their dotage arguing and tussling and insisting they were right about things they fought about 60 years ago, loving every minute of being angry with each other.

I appreciate those last few paragraphs were like jazz – I enjoyed them more than you did. – but the main point is valid. Even if Khan wins by becoming just another Pakistani politician he won’t change anything. He can’t if that is how he wins.  Pakistan’s fundamental problems: patronage, graft, feudalism, the stratification of society, bonded labour, the total lack of social mobility, the deliberate failure to educate the poor, and the medieval attitudes to women that come from medieval feudal overlords, cannot be solved by co-opting and buying up those same overlords, those same feudals, and creating more of those same patronage networks.

Disclaimer: my Pakistani politics may be a bit rusty – I am just easing back into it. If I’ve got anything wrong I would really genuinely like to hear about it.

*James Goldsmith: yes he humiliated David Mellor, the world’s greasiest lemon, but he was a fascist and he created this prick.





Oh Dear

11 08 2011

A rare foray into UK politics for me and a rare foray into opinion. I promise not to make a habit of it but it’s not every day your city catches fire:

One of the best pieces of television I have ever seen was Adam Curtis’s segment for Newswipe on the rise of Oh Dearism. He returns to similar ground in his blog post Goodies and baddies - which has to count as one of the greatest blog postings of all time. Adam Curtis is such a fantastic summator it seems wrong to summarise him and further, but here I go:

Oh Dearism is the phenomenon whereby, faced on the one hand with an increasingly complex world with political movements and consequences increasingly escaping categorisation and definition, and on the other hand a news media narrative and reductive reporting style which insists upon boiling down explanations, stripping out nuance, and turning news into easily understandable bite-sized news stories, we increasingly give up looking for explanation and merely observe the world as a succession of bad things happening for no real reason, to which we say “oh dear”.

I thought about Oh Dearism as I listened to both the government and most of my acquaintances respond to the recent spate of riots. Typical comments included, ” Most people care deeply about their neighbours and community. The acts last night were perpetrated by a tiny minority with no respect for others.” “What makes me most angry is how much this is going to hurt decent people who work very hard for a modest income” “I’m clear that they are in no way representative of the vast majority of young people in our country who despise them, frankly, as much as the rest of us do.”

Now I know this bit is going to be missed by people who want to be annoyed by this post but I’m going to say it anyway: I don’t disagree. In fact I agree completely.

That’s the thing about Oh Dearism: Oh Dearism isn’t wrong. Oh Dearism is far too trite, too irrelevant, too boring, to be wrong. And indulged in by friends and colleagues Oh Dearism is merely mildly irritating.

But what worries me is that this government doesn’t seem to be interested in engaging with the problem beyond indulging in Oh Dearism. And that is dangerous.

Here is George HW Bush engaging in some classic Oh Dearism after the second night of the LA race riots:

‎”[this is] purely criminal, What we saw last night and the night before in LA is not about civil rights. It’s not a message of protest. It’s been the brutality of a mob, pure and simple.”

Dan Quale went on to say that the riots had nothing to do with the Rodney King verdict – and so they went on for another week and established areas of the USA as no-go zones for the police to this day. Now here is Clegg after the first night of our riots:

“The damage from riots seen last night has nothing to do with the death of Mr Duggan; that is being investigated. The violence we saw was needless and opportunistic, where shopkeepers lost shops and families lost homes. The violence,looting and theft is utterly condemned and has only caused a sense of insecurity felt in the community”

Swap LA for Tottenham; swap Duggan for King …… but that too is a trite analysis, and that is not my point – my point is in both cases the Oh Dearism response didn’t work, not because it was incorrect but because it was irrelevant and because it didn’t even begin to touch upon the problem.

Clearly many of those involved in the riots were opportunists and thieves. Clearly the remainder used utterly illegitimate and unacceptable means to address what may or may not be legitimate grievances. But all that is noise, all that is irrelevance. What has happened is that a large number of people who mostly operated within the law have decided to mostly operate outside the law. In other words the social contract between the state and a large numbers of poor young individuals has been broken.

I am not making the argument (although some will) that the state broke the social contract when they shot Mark Duggan. It seems to me more likely that the social contract has been broken for some time*, and the police briefly losing control during the Duggan protest merely provided the opportunity for this lack of a social contract to become evident. But all these matters are entirely irrelevant. This is just yet more noise, yet more Oh Dear. All that matters is how that contract can be rebuilt. The state cannot, must not, just shrug its shoulders and say, “the social contract has been broken, Oh Dear”

To borrow and develop something a friend of mine said, if you kick a dog for long enough the dog will bite someone and it probably won’t be the person who kicked it. Saying that the dog is a bad dog, or that you feel sorry for the person who got bitten, doesn’t help the victim or make the dog feel bad. It is just a bit trite.

In the absence of an attempt to rebuild the social contract it seems the state is intent to just crush the riots through sheer brute force. Here’s Cameron again,

Whatever resources the police need they will get, whatever tactics police feel they need to employ, they will have legal backing to do so. We will do whatever is necessary to restore law and order on to our streets. Every contingency is being looked at, nothing is off the table.”

Apart from the fact that these words should send a shiver down the spine of any liberal, indeed any right thinking person, this is a recipe for disaster. In Paris when they tried to crush the riots through brute force, they lasted for a month. But even if one were to succeed, as the police did last night, all we have done is buy ourselves some time  - not a solution.

A considerable number of people are angry, are poor, are disillusioned, disaffected, and disenfranchised, have completely lost all trust in and respect for the police. As long as this remains the case these riots will happen again, and again – and even if it is many years until the next riot we will all be quivering under Damocles’ blade until a new social contract has been developed, and accepted, by the disaffected young people of Britain’s inner cities. And everything else is just another way of saying Oh Dear.

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*For what it is worth I don’t actually think the state is entirely to blame for the collapse of the social contract but it is the state’s job to fix it. To quote my favourite line in The Fall of the Roman Empire, “When a teacher teaches a pupil the same lesson, the same way, a hundred times and still they do not learn then there is either something wrong with the teacher or there is something wrong with the lesson.”





Idiots

5 08 2011

Hello,

The rest of Fiji coming soon but first I have to draw a table for idiots who think the death penalty is normal.

The most barbaric countries in the world:

Country

 Number executed in 2010

 Population  One execution per
Equatorial Guinea                                   4                         700,000                                  175,000
People’s Republic of China                             5,000                1,339,724,852                                  267,945
Iran                                252                     75,532,000                                  299,730
Libya                                 18                       6,355,000                                  353,056

North Korea

                                60                     24,346,000                                  405,767
Yemen                                 53                     22,492,035                                  424,378
Palestinian Authority                                   5                       3,935,249                                  787,050
Saudi Arabia                                 27                     27,136,977                              1,005,073
Somalia                                   8                       9,331,000                              1,166,375
Bahrain                                   1                       1,262,000                              1,262,000
Syria                                 17                     23,695,000                              1,393,824
Botswana                                   1                       1,800,098                              1,800,098
Belarus                                   2                       9,469,000                              4,734,500
Sudan                                   6                     30,894,000                              5,149,000
Taiwan                                   4                     23,174,528                              5,793,632
United States                                 46                   311,901,000                              6,780,457
Bangladesh                                   9                   151,030,000                            16,781,111
Egypt                                   4                     80,619,000                            20,154,750
Malaysia                                   1                     27,565,821                            27,565,821
Iraq                                   1                     31,672,000                            31,672,000
Japan                                   2                   127,950,000

                           63,975,000

And those were the only poor sods executed last year because it is a barbaric practice that nobody in their right mind condones any more.





Fiji part 1

31 07 2011

Fiji map

I’m splitting these up into several blog posts to make sure there is less of a pause between blogs.

Who lives there?: A surprising number of people – nearly a million. To understand where Fiji is you really have to have a snoop around Google Maps and look at a political map of the south pacific. It probably won’t tell you much to say that there are 110 inhabited islands, 200 uninhabited islands and 500 islets scattered across an 1000 mile by 1000 mile area.

The two largest islands are the northern island of Vanua Levu and the southern one of Viti Levu. They are both about 100 miles by 100 miles – making them the largest oceanic islands in the Pacific bar the big island of Hawaii. 87% of the population live on those two islands. The remaining inhabitants mostly live on outlying islands, on a lose archipelago (Lau) about 200 miles east of the main group, or a long thin chain (Yasawa) about 70 miles north west of the main group. The small island of Rotuma, 500 miles to the north, is culturally quite important.

The closest island is the French territory of Wallis and Futuna about 2-300 miles to the north east. Other close islands include: Tuvalu (about 600 miles to the north), Samoa (700 miles to the north east), Tonga (3-400 miles to the south east), New Zealand (1,000 miles to the south), the French territory of New Caledonia (700 miles to the south west), and Vanuatu (600 miles to the west.

Two types of people make up almost all of the population. The denonyms of these groups is somewhat politically charged and the subject of much controversy. Those who mostly use the term “Native Fijians” are the descendants of those who inhabited Fiji before the British got there. They are mostly of Melanesian (ie probably originally from New Guinea) origin with a significant Polynesian (ie possibly from Malaya originally, but having been island hopping – mostly in the more remote islands to the north – for a good few thousands years). This group are mostly Christian and mostly speak Bau Fijian

The second group are now mostly referred to as Indo Fijians. Most of these are the descendants of indentured servants the British brought over from all over northern India, although there are a few more recent economic migrants from Gujrat and the Punjab. They are roughly 50% Hindu and 50% Muslim, the Muslims in turn being roughly split 50/50 between Sunni and Shia. Most speak Fijian Hindi – a language which is described as as similar to Hindi as Afrikaans is to Dutch.

Slightly more than 50% describe themselves as native Fijian and around 35% as Indo Fijian. The rest either acknowledge they are mixed race or belong to one of Fiji’s small but significant ethnic minorities. There are 12,000 or so Rotumans – only 2,000 of which now live on Rotuma island. Their culture owes much more to Tongan and Samoan influence than it does Fijian. There are about 7,000 members of other minorities -most of them Tongans. Tongans traditionally came to Fiji, which has more trees than Tonga, to build their larger and longer distance ships.

Fiji’s coat of arms is cute.

How does the system work? (the theory): In 2006 the Fijian military staged a coup (their second in 6 years) and deposed the government of Fiji. In 2007 they reinstalled the former President but without the parliament and with the military still running the executive. In 2009 Fiji’s supreme court ruled the military takeover illegal and insisted that democracy be restored. All the military officials resigned and the President was left in sole charge pending new elections. The very next day, said President announced that due to the constitutional crisis the only thing to do would be to suspend Fiji’s constitution, abolish the supreme court, and re-appoint the military led government. This is supposed to be an interim method pending elections which will be held soon – allegedly. So the text below describes a system which is currently in suspension, and may never return.

Fiji has a President who is appointed for a five year term by the Great Council of Chiefs in consultation with the Prime Minister. They are supposed to have only nominal powers but recent events have shown how powerful they can become at times of constitutional uncertainty. Executive power should lie with the Prime Minister, who is formally appointed by the President but is always the person best able to command a majority in the House of Representatives.

There are four legislative bodies: two formal and two informal. The House of Representatives is the lower and the most powerful of the two formal legislative bodies and appoints the executive PM and Cabinet. The House of Representatives consists of 71 members: 25 elected by universal suffrage and 46 along ethnic or communal lines. each elector gets 2 votes: one in the universal suffrage election and one in the communal election. Election is by AV with singel member constituencies.

Thus Fiji is split up into 25 geographic areas with roughly equal populations for the purpose of electing the 25 members elected by universal suffrage. Separately, and with no relation to these boundaries, Fiji is split up into 19 geographic areas with roughly equal populations for the purpose of electing the 19 members elected by Indo Fijians. Only Indo Fijians can vote for candidates for these constituencies. Separately, and with no relation to these boundaries, Fiji is split up into 3 geographic areas with roughly equal populations for the purpose of electing the 3 members elected by “General Electors” (amalgamated smaller ethnic minorities). Only general electors can vote for candidates for these constituencies. Separately Fiji is considered one large constituency for the purpose of electing the member elected by Rotumans. Only Rotumans can vote for candidate for this constituency. Separately, and with no relation to any of the proceeding boundaries, Fiji is split up into 23 geographic areas  for the purpose of electing the 23 members elected by “native Fijians”. Only “native Fijians” can vote for candidates for these constituencies. Unlike the others these 23 seats are not created by splitting Fiji into geographic areas with roughly equal populations. Rather 17 of them are demarcated by the traditional territories of various Fijian Tribes, the remaining 6 seats are created by splitting up the rest of Fiji into siz geographic areas with roughly equal populations.

Confused? Well it’s a mess, and its made more of a mess by a failure to review electoral boundaries in many years, leading to various rotten borough accusations. In addition as both registration and voting are compulsory, the government effectively has your ethnicity on file, which has never been a good thing.

The upper house in the legislative is the Senate. 32 members are appointed for five years term. They are appointed by the President but the President is required by law to accept the suggestions of various groups. 14 are appointed on the suggestion of the Great Council of Chiefs, although in practice they delegate the actual choosing to the 14 provincial councils each of which select one. 9 are then selected by the Prime Minister, 8 by the official Leader of the Opposition, and 1 by the Council of Rotuma. In addition to the traditional roles of the upper house, any changes to the laws which guarantee native Fijians the continuing ownership of most of Fiji must be approved by 9 of the 14 senators appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs.

Then there are the informal Chief’s parliaments, they  makes elections to the House of Representatives look positively rational. I characterised them as informal legislative chambers but this is perhaps unfair as they have significant powers of patronage and appointment, as outlined above, and not least in the appointment of the President. In addition there is a powerful convention in Fijian politics that no significant changes to the constitution or the law should happen without consulting the chiefs through these bodies.

There are two parliaments: the House of Chiefs, and the Great Council of Chiefs. The House of Chiefs consists of every hereditary noble of traditional Fijian tribal society – there are about 70 in total. The House of Chiefs serves no real function except in that the Great Council of Chiefs is elected from its members.

The Great Council of Chiefs has 52 members, all of whom must be Chiefs, and 3 ex officio members who don’t have to be. The ex officio members are the President, Vice President, and Prime Minister. 6 of the full members are appointed by the President on the advice of the Minister for Fijian Cultural Affairs. 42 are chosen, 3 each, by the 14 Fijian provincial councils. 3 are chosen by the Council of Rotuma. All of these appointees are for five year terms. The final member, Sitiveni Rabuka, was a significant figure in recent Fijian politics about whom you will be hearing a lot. He was made a life member in 1987 following a constitutional crisis.

Brilliantly obscure Fijian constitutional fact. The nation of Fiji does not acknowledge the existence of a Fijian monarchy but the Great Council of Chiefs does and insists Queen Elisabeth II is also Queen of Fiji.

Fiji has fairly powerful local government – up to a point. It is divided into 4 divisions and the self-governing island of Rotuma. the 4 divisions are divided up into 14 provinces.

The divisions are run by commissioners appointed by the Prime Minister but have very little power apart from by playing a coordinating role. The provinces are run by provincial councils which are elected directly. They can set taxes, pass by-laws and run virtually every access of services. However the national government’s civil service does have the power to veto both those decisions and the appointment of the executive chair of the council.

The Council of Rotuma is designed like a provincial council but with greater power. Specifically it has powers relating to  ”peace, order and good government of the Rotuman community and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, relating to (a) the keeping clean of Rotuma and the promotion of public health; (b) the social and economic betterment of the Rotuman community; (c) the performance of communal work by members of the Rotuman community and other communal activities of the Rotuman community; (d) the control of livestock on Rotuma; (e) the prevention or removal of public [waste?] (f) the care of children and aged persons; (g) the conservation of food supplies on Rotuma. [and] (2) Such regulations may impose penalties for the breach thereof not exceeding imprisonment for a term of four months or a fine of one hundred dollars or both such imprisonment and fine.”

These powers can be exercised provisionally by the chair of the council but are subject to ratification by the Fijian parliament. Rotuma is constitutionally governed by the Rotuma act 1927 which has a great section on the legality of killing pigs. Seriously it’s one of my favourite constitutions.

More soon





Guest post: Finland

11 07 2011

FinlandChris Terry, from Britain votes here for all your Finnish needs:

Who lives there?: More than 5 million people. Finland is mostly ethnically homogenous. There is one big divide, which is not technically an ethnic divide but rather a lingual one. 290,000 Finns (about 5% of the population) speak Swedish as a first language. Ethnically and culturally these people are not Swedes, they are Finns and are generally known as ‘Swedish-speaking Finns’. On the most part they are descendants of Finns who learned Swedish for purposes of social mobility in the historical period when Finland was ruled by Sweden and administered in Swedish. As such these people, in contrast to most national minorities, actually tend to be very middle class and they are concentrated around the affluent Southern coastal region.

Swedish speakers also constitute a clear majority on the island of Aland, which has such autonomy and special status as to practically constitute a territory of Finland as part of a deal worked out by the League of Nations in 1921 following the ‘Aland Crisis’ in which Sweden and Finland almost went to war over the principle of who the islands should belong to.

The other notable native minority in Finland is the Sami of which there are just under 10,000. They are an indigenous inuit-like people who live in Finland’s north.

In general Finland has relatively low rates of immigration, what immigration there is mostly comes from other European countries and Russia. According to the 2010 census there are only about 200,000 people in Finland whose first language is not either Swedish or Finnish, with Russian and Estonian speakers making up more than a 1/3rd of that. Immigration is therefore not much of an issue outside Helsinki, though that hasn’t prevented the rise of populism (which we’ll talk about later).

Finns are notably for their language, Finnish, which is one of only a handful of non-Indo-European languages in Europe. It is a Finno-Ugric language and considered to be quite beautiful; it was the basis for one of Tolkien’s Elvish languages.

I should also note that Finland used to be somewhat larger, a large amount of land, particularly Karelia, was ceded to the Soviets during WWII and remains part of Russia. Occasional calls to return Karelia to Finland are minority voices, however, and the area is by far and away majority Russian now.

How does the system work? (the theory): In contrast to the Scandinavian states of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, Finland is a Republic, specifically a semi-presidential one. Originally on independence in 1917 Finland was to adopt a German Prince as its King but when Germany became a Republic shortly thereafter this was deemed a bad idea.

The President was originally elected by an electoral college of local politicians but as of 1994 the Finnish President is directly elected on a two round system with a standard 50%+1 threshold. Ironically as the position has become more democratised it has also lost power, with the Presidency moving from a French-like Semi-Presidential system more towards a ceremonial figurehead position with, for example, the Presidential veto removed in 2000. The Presidency still retains powers in foreign policy and defense, but the Prime Minister is now the most powerful position in the country. Removing further powers is a subject of some debate. The President is elected on a six year term.

The parliament, the Eduskunta, is elected by open-list PR in 15 constituencies that match the boundaries of Finland’s traditional provinces, with the single exception of Uusimaa, as it includes Helsinki which forms its own constituency (nonetheless Helsinki and Uusimaa still form the largest two constituencies). Parties may form electoral alliances, in which they run separately but pool votes. Voters MUST vote for a candidate, votes are then pooled within a party or electoral alliance and seats assigned by d’Hondt.

The upsides to this system are that it is proportional, it is relatively easy to understand (though it does result in some big ballot papers in the larger constituencies!) and it is very candidate centred. Candidates must campaign not just against opponents in other parties but, in a typically lower level way, they must compete with members of their own parties. Finns take the personal aspect of their vote increasingly seriously.

Criticisms of the system usually focus on the electoral alliances aspect and the constituencies. The alliances are criticised because once in an alliance the system does not differentiate between parties so a party with more votes can get candidates elected behind a party it is in alliance with who has less votes but who homogenises votes behind one candidate.

The issue with the constituencies is the vast differences in district magnate, from six to thirty three seats in a constituency, with a prior Green League leader failing to be re-elected after getting 11% of the vote in one constituency due to district magnitude and her refusal to form an alliance.

The prior government had a modification to the electoral law on the table which would have gotten rid of alliances, modified the system of apportioning seats to one based on national votes, and instituted a 3% national threshold. Constituencies would have technically been kept as would the Open-PR system but seats would apportioned based on national votes on a complex algorithym. The future of this amendment is under question under the new government, as the Social Democrats oppose it, arguing that it reduces direct accountability (the SDP is also advantaged by the current system).

Aland elects one MP, essentially by FPTP. Generally this MP is one of Aland’s native parties but then joins the Swedish People’s Party group.

Parliamentary terms are every four years. After an election the President invites the leader of the largest party to form a government. Coalition formation in Finland is generally a relatively speedy, simple affair by European standards, at least these days it is. Coalitions are generally over-sized, a combination of historic institutional rules which required parliamentary supermajorities for certain types of bills, and a consensus-seeking political culture. PMs often invite minor parties to join governments for their own purposes. For example the Swedish People’s Party are always in government in order to represent that community and in the last government the Green League was invited to participate despite not being needed for a majority because the PM at the time wanted to demonstrate his own green credentials.

Like other Nordic states Finland demonstrates a surprising level of decentralisation for such a small country. For example, the entire healthcare system is run at a municipal level, indeed 2/3rds of public services are provided by municipalities. This is a combination of the power of the Centre Party, which has a highly decentralist political ideology and due to public service reforms encouraged by the pressures of globalisation.

They levy a flat income tax of 16-20%. If a municipality has a population of more than 8% which speak either of the official languages of Finnish and Swedish that municipality is bilingual and must provide services in both languages. If the municipality has less than 8% speaking either language than it is unilingual and only needs to provide services in one language.

In between the municipalities and the central government lie the six regions, which are very weak and exist primarily to distribute EU funds and other such technocratic duties. They are not directly elected, they are filled by municipal councillors instead.

How does the system work? (the practice): Like other Nordic states Finland generally ranks highly on indices of democracy, though a book called ‘Quasi-Democracy’ caused a storm in Finland in 2008 when it argued that Finland’s consensus seeking culture led to the creation of dry centrist governments which fail to reflect public opinion, the book even goes as far as to suggest that Finland still lacks features of a true Western liberal democracy.

How did we get here?: It is not clear when Finns first arrived in Finland, and it is a subject of debate amongst linguists when Finno-Ugric languages arrived in the area.

Historically Finland has been a somewhat contested area, but Finland came under the more or less uninterrupted rule of Sweden from about 1150 up until 1809. During this period Finland evolved several features typical of Nordic societies. For instance there was no serfdom, and so the peasants and the workers came to be particularly well educated. They also came to experience local forms of proto-representative government known as tings. These two characteristics laid the roots of Finnish Social Democratic and Agrarian movements later on.

As part of Sweden Finland was administered in Swedish, as such the middle and upper classes were all Swedish speaking, laying the seeds for today’s lingual divide.

In 1809 Finland was handed into Russian control after Sweden lost the Finnish War with the country. As such Finland became the Grand Duchy of Finland. The Russians were pretty poor colonisers and the country was still run pretty much as before. The Russians, however, started a process of encouraging Finnish identity to attempt to stop identification with Sweden. Doing so, however, encouraged the creation of Finnish nationalism and the creation of a Finnish nationalist movement which grew in strength and passion.

This nationalist movement came to be wrapped up in the politics of class, language, identity and political liberalisation. Russia only tagged on that this was a bad thing by 1899, beginning a policy of Russification known as the ‘years of oppression’ in Finland. However with the Russian Revolution of 1905 the Finns launched a general strike which resulted in a directly elected Parliament elected by universal suffrage, the first time women in Europe could vote.

The revolution of 1917 threw Finland into anarchy. Most of the Social Democratic Party came to see the Bolsheviks as an example to follow and a bloody civil war began between the socialist Reds, and the Whites, analogous to the divides in Russia. The Whites were drawn from the middle and upper classes, especially the Swedish-speakers, the rural regions and the conservative North. Unlike in Russia, the Whites won.

The triumph of the Whites had several major effects on Finland compared to other Nordic states. While the left in most Nordic states split between the Communist and the Social Democratic at this time, the Finnish split was particularly dramatic, and the Communists remained much more powerful and popular than in Sweden, Denmark or Norway. The Social Democrats were also stained by association with the Reds, even though they now became reformist.

The result was a much weaker left than elsewhere in Nordic states. While the SDP had had a small majority in parliament before the war it now became much weaker, it was still an incredibly important party but it would never achieve the hegemony of Scandinavian Social Democracy.

Then came World War II. Unknown to Finland the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact placed Finland in the ‘Soviet sphere of influence’. The Soviets invaded in the Winter War. They had three times as many soldiers, thirty times as many aircraft, and a hundred times as many tanks as the Finns, but they had been crippled by Stalin’s purges and the Finns had superior knowledge of the geography and fought a guerilla war using improvised weapons. The term ‘Molotov Cocktail’ comes from the period as the Finns named their improvised petrol bombs after the Soviet foreign minister. In 1940, the Finns were forced to cede 11% of their territory. There is a famous phrase attributed to Soviet figures that the Russians gained ‘Just enough territory to bury their dead.’ To my mind it appears to be apocryphal, but it does basically sum up the situation.

This was then followed by the ‘Continuation War’ which began 15 months later in 1941 and ended in 1944, essentially this was a continuation of the same conflict, hence the name. The Finns allied with the Germans and attempted to retake their lost territory on the same day as the start of Operation Barbarossa. Nominally the UK declared war on Finland [the only time two undisputed democracies have ever declared war on each other – ED] and the Finns were allied to the Germans but in reality it was pretty much a straight Finnish-Soviet war.

Finland’s relationship with Germany was notably different to other allies of Germany. They refused to sign the Tripartite War pact meaning it was not, de jure part of the Axis. Finland also refused to take negative actions against Jews and Finnish Jews fought on the frontlines. Nonetheless there was a sense of national guilt which was substantially weakened with the revelation of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

The Soviets won the war, and Finland was then subjected to what was known as, perojatively ‘Finlandisation’. Finland was essentially in the Soviet sphere of influence despite being a capitalist democracy. It had to be careful to maintain sufficient neutrality so as not to annoy the Soviets, but also attempt to survive as an independent democracy.

Government became very unstable. The Finnish Democratic People’s League (SDKL), a Communist front organization, was one of the big three parties in most elections, even winning in 1958. It could not be in power, and at times the conservative National Coalition Party (KOK) had to be kept from power too due to its strident pro-Americanism. Cabinet instability was common due to the threats that could be made by parties as there were simply no other choices available. However, with time, Finland came to adapt and politicians learned how to bring parties into cabinet and deal with their more radical impulses.

With the end of the USSR, the SDKL became irrelevant and reformed as the Left Alliance (VAS). A particularly notable moment came with the ‘rainbow coalition’ of 1995-2003. Composed of Social Democrats, Conservatives, Greens, Swedish minority politicians and the Left Alliance the oddball coalition ranged from far-left to the centre-right. In doing so it broke trust in the political class and fueled the rise of the True Finns. In the most recent election the True Finns won 19.1% of the vote and 39/200 seats.

Who’s in charge?: The current President is Tarja Halonen, who was elected as Finland’s first female President in 2000. Halonen was known as a strident left-winger within the SDP in the past and she is opposed to NATO membership, and has a slight pacifist bent. She has high approval ratings, but will step down in 2012 as she is term-limited. The SDP have held the Presidency since 1982, which includes the entire period since direct election was introduced, though the favourite in 2012’s election must surely be the National Coalition’s Sauli Niinisto who ran Halonen surprisingly close in 2006.

The historic elections of earlier this year resulted in a bizarre six-party coalition headed by the centre-right National Coalition. Their junior coalition partners are the Social Democrats, the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democrats. I’ll go through the parties in parliament by size.

The National Coalition Party (KOK) is the biggest party in the Finnish Parliament and the party of PM Jyrki Katainen. It holds 44 seats on 20.4% of the vote. It is a catch-all right-of-centre party, generally referred to as ‘liberal conservative’ as it combines right-wing liberal and conservative strands. At the moment the more liberal wing is in power and the party has come to endorse multiculturalism (with limits) and same-sex marriage. That said KOK does include religious right parliamentarians and takes what is, by Finnish standards, a militaristic stance. KOK is also passionately pro-American and pro-European, it is the most pro-European party in Finland and supports controversial EU bail-out measures. Traditionally it has been the big 3 Finnish parties but it was been growing since Niinisto’s good outing in 2006. It became the largest party for the first time in 2011 in a somewhat pyrrhic victory as it was forced into coalition with the SDP and lost seats and votes. The KOK is much more urban than most European centre-right parties as the Centre Party dominates rural regions. It is the largest party in Helsinki. This helps to explain some of its comparative cosmopolitanism.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) is a Nordic Social Democratic party. It is notably more right-wing than most other Nordic parties due to its comparative weakness, a legacy of the Finnish civil war. It enjoys strong links to Finland’s trade unions. It won 19.1% and 42 seats in what was a surprisingly good showing for the SDP in 2011. This was not generally seen as an attempt to keep the True Finns down more than anything else. The party, like most European social democratic parties, is ideologically extremely directionless and confused, current party leader Jutta Urplainen is generally not thought highly of either. However the party is now the second largest in government and Urplainen is now Finance Minister.

The True Finns (PS). Oh, dear. So much has been written about the True Finns it’s hard to know where to begin. The party originates from the ashes of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) which was formed from a split in the Centre Party in 1959. The Rural Party was a populist-agrarian party which entered government in the 1980s, lost its anti-establishment appeal, slumped, and was down to 1.3% of the vote and 1 seat by 1995. True Finns rose from its ashes, gaining slightly in each election until 2011 when it went from 4.1% and 5 seats to 19.1% and 39. Like the SMP, PS is a populist party, and that is pretty much all anyone can agree on. Under Timo Soini the party has certainly come to be nationalist to some degree, concentrating on Eurosceptisism, particularly. The party is noted for its strident anti-bailout position. It also opposes bilingual policies aimed at appeasing Swedish-speakers and is strongly socially conservative. Soini himself is a Catholic, a rare thing in Lutheran Finland. The party’s economic policies are generally left-leaning but not socialistic, per se. Britain’s leading Scandinavian politics expert, David Arter, has described policy in this area as ‘Christian social’.

The immediate temptation is to put it in the ‘right-wing populist’ category with people like Geert Wilders and Jorg Haider but Soini himself is not particularly anti-immigration, however some members of his party certainly are. True Finns is notable for its eccentric range of oddball attention-grabbing candidates. Former and current MPs include Tony Halme, a former WWF wrestler, Veltto Virtanen, an artist and musician who insists on wearing a beret at all times, Jussi Halla-aho, Finland’s best known blogger, and former Olympians. Outside the MPs the candidates who failed to get elected in 2011 are, if anything, even more bizarre including a licensed shaman and a ‘bear man’.

True Finns eccentric range of personalities remains its biggest problem and doubts remain about its government suitability to do with its unpredictability, sharply anti-establishment image and opposition to compromise. Its voters come from all parties and interestingly tend to be from the most radical ends. They are Social Democrats who think the Social Democrats have become too capitalist, they are Conservatives who think the National Coalition is too liberal, they are Agrarians who think the Centre Party no longer cares about the countryside. True Finns is now the largest party in the opposition. Most observers had expected it to be in the government after its triumph, but it appears the party was unwilling to cede the necessary amount of policy ground. The government is now defined by True Finns, however: a government formed, essentially, as an anti-True Finns coalition, but which will inevitably feel forced to give in to some of the party’s demands in order to win back PS voters.

The Centre Party (KESK) can, in a sense, make a claim to be Finland’s traditionally dominant party. It is not numerically dominant, the SDP wins the most elections, but it has been a member of the most governments. KESK has its beginnings in the Finnish Agrarian movement. The Nordic political spectrum resembles a triangle: urban left, urban right, agrarian centre. Agrarianism has several notable features. Firstly it is passionate about protecting the rural way of life, and so the Centre Party is often identified by its urban opponents with expensive agricultural subsidies. Agrarians are also highly decentralist due to suspicion of urbanised government elites and similarly they are Eurosceptic [ingrates – ED]. Farmers remain an important part of KESK’s base but they no longer make up enough of the population to win an election and so the party has come to be ideologically flexible and centrist. It has a wide ranging support. As the party at the Centre of the political spectrum it often acts as a ‘hinge party’, without which government formation is impossible. From 2003 until 2011 KESK was the largest party and lead the government.

The party’s ideological flexibility, and long periods in government have given it a reputation for corruption. Despite the personal popularity of Premier Mari Kiviniemi KESK went from 23.1% and 51 seats, and largest party status to 15.8% and 35 seats, putting them into fourth place. Kiviniemi now leads the only opposition party besides PS.

The Left Alliance (VAS) is all that remains of Finland’s formerly massive Communist tradition. VAS is a democratic socialist party which is often directionless and seemingly incapable of halting its continual decline. It also has problems with internal division. Whereas the SDKL was once capable of actively winning elections VAS got only 8.1% of the vote and 14 seats this year. Its voters are generally considered to divide between nostalgic old blue-collar Commies and young hipster types. The party will encounter fresh issues now it has joined the KOK-led government as signified by the fact that two MPs left the party to sit in the opposition reducing the party caucus to 12.

‘Not left, not right, but forwards’. That’s what the Green League (VIHR) would have you believe in any case. The right tends to see them as a bunch of smelly hippies and the left sees them as traitors after they went into coalition with KOK and KESK in 2007. In truth the party probably leans more to the left than the right. They are the second biggest party in Helsinki. In 2011 they scored 7.2% of the vote and 10 seats, a drop of 5, a result of their ‘betrayal’.

The Swedish People’s Party (SFP) is one of Finland’s smallest parties but also one of its oldest. It represents Swedish-speaking minority interests. An ideologically flexible party the party has tended to end up in government no matter what, where it is used to demonstrate inclusion of the Swedish-speakers. It has been in government almost constantly since 1956. The party has been criticised in the Swedish-speaking community for its allowing the last government to get rid of Swedish as a compulsory subject at high school, the party’s ideological flexibility extending apparently to its own single-issue. It was polling badly before True Finns started to bounce and then bounced back slightly. At the same time the percentage of Swedish-speakers if falling and therefore so is the party’s support, which currently stays between around 4% and 5%. In the latest election they got 4.3% of the vote and 9 MPs, including the representative from Aland.

Finally we come to the last party in parliament and government, the Christian Democrats (KD). The party originates in a 1958 split from KOK. It is dedicated to the protection of Christian schools and Christian morality in Finland. It is fond of alliances with other right-wing parties and has aligned with KESK, KOK and PS in the past. They hold the Interior Ministry in the new government. KD got 4% of the vote and 6 seats in 2011.

A photo Finnish

What does it look like?: Finland is the Northernmost country in Europe, a quarter of its landmass lies within the Arctic Circle. In winter parts of the North can get as low as -50 Celcius. Finland divides into four regions, broadly speaking. The coastal regions are broad clay plains and highly agricultural. The coast near the Archipelago Sea, ‘Archipelego Finland’ is very rocky however, with large portions of inland water. Interior Finland is known as the ‘Finnish lake district’ and is heavily forested. The North, particularly Lapland, is snowy and covered in shrubs. Finland has 187,888 lakes and 179,584 islands. The country is mostly flat. 86% of Finland is forested.

 Finland

What are the issues?: Unemployment has been a problem. It is 7.8% as of April 2011, though it is in clear decline. Finland has been worse hit by the financial crisis than Sweden or Norway.

Swedish language laws are creating increasing levels of strife, part of the reason behind True Finns rise.

Immigration is JUST starting to come onto the agenda.

A constant argument is over whether to join NATO. After the fall of the USSR Finland quickly abandoned its historic neutrality to join the EU in 1995 but it remains outside the military alliance. Polls usually show Finns against joining NATO, with support for joining linked with the political right.

The biggest political issue of the next few years is likely to be how best to deal with True Finns, however.

A good source of impartial information is: Finland’s state broadcaster YLE has an English language site and has English language TV and radio news broadcasts available on their website.

It’s on recess for July but the Helsingin Sanomat, one of Finland’s best respected papers, publishes an English language edition.

The Helsinki Times is a specialist English language weekly. It is my preferred choice for politics.

Otherwise presseurop.com is fantastic for politics anywhere in Europe.

A good book is: For general Nordic politics: The Nordic Model: Scandinavia Since 1945 by Mary Hilson is a generalised history of Scandinavia since 1945, whereas Scandinavian politics todayby David Arter is probably the best basic guide to Nordic politics in general. Arter’s Democracy in Scandinavia: Consensual, Majoritarian or Mixed? is also a good shout for a description of the political systems, whereas The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countriesis a good shout if you want to learn about Nordic Social Democracy, or Nordic Agrarian parties.

An abridged version of Quasi-democracy is available as a PDF here. ‘From Grand Duchy to Modern State’ is a political history of Finland.

When are the next elections?: There is a Presidential election in 2012. KOK’s Sauli Niinisto has already announced his candidature and is the favourite. The next legislative election is scheduled for 2015, assuming the rainbow coalition lasts that long.





Meanwhile…

4 07 2011

It’s been an interesting couple of months. World Elections has covered most of the main elections. Highlights for me have been:

Turkey’s elections gave an unprecedented third term to Recep Erdoğan. Their majority fell slightly but a third successive landslide is a third successive landslide. The election confirms Erdoğan as Turkey’s most important politician since Ataturk, and that his programme of slightly nationalist, very slightly Islamic, modernisation will not be derailed by traditionalists, secularists, rationalists, liberals (with whom Erdoğan has a strained but not entirely antagonistic relationship), or a stalled EU accession process. I thoroughly recommend The New Turkey: The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe, even though it is poorly written (or rather bizzarly written: it combines the wide eyed wonder of a confused hippie, the frenetic cutting of a Jerry Bruckheimer movie, and the ability to keep to the point of a child whose Ritalin has been switched for concentrated Sunny D) and is overly favourable to the Erdoğan project, it does do a decent job of explaining modern Turkey.

Peru chose Aids over Cancer – or whichever way around it was. Anyway they now have an Amerindian nationalist ostensibly left wing President called Ollanta Humala. He may be the  quasi-facist demagogue that some think, he may be another Evo Morales (you can take that as an insult or a compliment) or the new Chaves (less likely) or it could turn out everyone was over-reacting and he’s actually quite dull.

India is creaking in interesting ways. Congress is going through a rough patch, and whilst poor state elections can mostly be put down to local factors (and as the cow belt largely wasn’t up it was more Congress allies that were effected directly) what is harder to explain away is the growing and significant anti-corruption protest movement. It’s not quite yet the Indian Arab Spring but it is very very very interesting. I don’t quite know where it is going – and if it will be effectively be co-opted by one of the extant powers as so many similar movements have been before, or if it is the start of something new – but it is exciting.

Thailand is back in the hands of the Reds after the election of Thakisn Sinawatra’s sister as President. A fascinating country and story but one that has to wait for another day.

Europe seems to be going rightwards but to be honest I struggle to care about European elections unless they are truly mad (I am looking forward to France and Italy). Belgium has now gone a year without a government, breaking all existing records and meaning that these articles have dated quite well.

The Arab spring  has got nasty as we knew it would. There is vague civil war in Syria and there is nothing vague about it in Libya which has split almost as it was in antiquity: into Berber and Punic areas. Meanwhile Bahrain’s government has tried their best to crush the uprising (even destroying the totemic roundabout) but this has just led to the movement developing along Sunni/Shia Iran vs Saudi Arabia lines: and if Saudi Arabia and Iran clash then the winner will not be Bahrain.

Yemen is interesting – Saudi Arabia gambling on amputating the limb (Saleh) in the hope of saving the body (a weak and undemocratic Yemen). It is important to note the difference (as too few articles do) between the uprising, which is a new and largely peaceful movement for greater democratic powers largely in the cities, and the insurgency which predates the uprising by several years. The Yemeni government tries hard to conflate the two, and there are synergies – particularly with regards to the North Yemeni political domination of the south – but they are distinct; not least geographically as the insurgency is a very rural phenomenon.

There are actually two insurgencies: the South Yemeni one (more accurately East Yemeni) is based around a rejection of North Yemeni political hegemony and is much more recent. The Shia insurgency is much more significant (they even have a mini de facto state) and is based around a rejection of Sunni majoritarianism. It is the Shia insurgency which worries Saudi Arabia the most (they span the border) – and their actions have far more to do with that than quashing the democracy movement (not that they don’t enjoy a good democracy crushing too).

Meanwhile in Egypt and Tunisia it appears the old guard have re-branded rather than disappeared and this is leading to renewed clashes

Elsewhere in Africa there is a lot going on and I thoroughly recommend Think Africa’s Politics section. In brief:

In Somalia Abdiweli Mohamed Ali is serving as interim PM but, as always, all is flux. The previous PM was a qualified success by the very low standards of Somali PMs but allowed his term to expire without any thought to the sucession, then attempted to elongate his term, was talked out of it at the last minute, and left abruptly and without making what happens next at all clear.

Kagame is losing some of his shine in Rwanda and Astroturfing Twitter hasn’t helped. Amnesty have done a great report on the state of the press there:

Jonathan’s riding his Goodluck in Nigeria, but the sidelineing of the Yoruba community may not be a smart long term move politically – especially as Nigeria does no longer seem to be such a one party state.

Sudan and South Sudan are discovering that secession does not solve all their problems and are scrapping over the border and everything else they can think of.





The state of Sri Lanka – Part two: taking sides against the family

28 06 2011

The last post finished with the horror that was the last two weeks of the civil war in 2009. If you haven’t seen Channel 4′s excellent and harrowing documentary ”The Killing Fields” then I thoroughly recommend it. If you are more of a left brain person then the UN have written a 214 page report which covers much of the same ground. The point is that both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE did some pretty terrible things. This post will explore both how they were allowed to happen and why they aren’t been investigated by explaining a little about how Sri Lanka works now.

The three brothers

The Joe Kennedy of Sri Lanka was a man named Don Alwin Rajapaksa. He was a founding member of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party and an MP from 1947 to 1965. He served as a junior cabinet minister twice but his greatest achievement was building a political dynasty who now run Sri Lanka. His brother served a state governor, one of his nephews is the current Sri Lankan Ambassador to the USA, another is the current Ambassador to Russia, his eldest son is the current speaker of parliament, his son-in-law is the Chief Executive of Sri Lankan Airways, and all in all something like 70 members of his extended family have senior roles in the government. But when talking about the Rajapaksa’s hold on the Sri Lankan Government, all these relatives are merely hangers on, the real power is held by Don Alwin’s three middle sons:

Mahinda

Mahinda RajapaksaMahinda has been the President of Sri Lanka since 2005. He is avuncular, very good at bread and circuses, and superb at winning elections. Allegedly, and in all probability to maintain plausible denyability, he is not personally as involved in some of the murkier aspects of the Sri Lankan state as his brothers, but this should not be taken as meaning he is in any way the most ethical brother. The Rajapaksa project: authoritarianism, nationalism, and militariation – particularly the latter – is very much a Mahinda project. Moreover, it is not at all clear how much the distance between Mahinda and the crueller elements of the state is real, and to what extent it is a product of the Sri Lankan media’s observance of the long-standing taboo about directly criticising the President; thus one invariably hears “an underling severely let down the President”, or “the President is clearly receiving some bad advice” as opposed to “Mahinda is a psycho”

Surprisingly, he used to be a human rights lawyer. Indeed he made a name for himself defending JVP activists against the government and taking on Habeas Corpus cases when no-one else would. An interesting effect of this is that he had, and to a certain extent still has, many personal friends in the world of human rights lawyers and Sri Lankan civil society. This hasn’t done them much good as -as you will see – being a friend of Mahinda offers you no protection, and arguably puts you at greater risk. Whilst opinions differ on the subject it appears Mahinda was only ever really interested in human rights work for the political leverage it could generate for him against the UNP.

Brothers notwithstanding, his control over the Sri Lankan state is considerable. He has personally taken responsibility for four ministerial departments: defence, finance and planning, ports and aviation (more important than it seems given the possibility for bribery), and highways (also more important than it seems for reasons that will become clear if you ever need to get anywhere in Sri Lanka in a hurry). These departments collectively control 70% of the Government of Sri Lanka’s budget, as well as giving him direct control over his brother’s departments. In addition as Commander in Chief of the Armed forces of an increasingly militarised country (the Army control much that isn’t the traditional role of the military – most recently taking direct control of Colombo’s municipal services) and as a man who has devoted his entire presidency to increasing the power of the executive (see this report on the effect of the President appointing everyone that matters in the judiciary) it is very clear that he is the only power that matters in Sri Lanka.

He is notoriously corrupt and nepotistic and, since his father’s death, he has been the primary driver behind the insertion of a Rajapaksa into every conceivable role. The classic example is the development of his home town of Hambantota – which has been showered with largesse despite its lack of economic or strategic need , including an international port and a test match cricket stadium – the Mahinda Rajapaksa stadium. His son, Namal, is the local MP, and it was largely to help his electoral prospects that the stadium was built.

Mahinda has eliminated term limits and so could be in charge for a while to come. However the  constraints of being the president – particularly when it comes to overt corruption – may tempt Mahinda into a life as an éminence grise / Prescott style soap-box-occupier, provided he can manage his succession. He clearly is trying to nurture Namal as an heir apparent, and this is causing tension with the other brothers who would rather another brother – probably Basil – should come next. Meanwhile the SLFP old timers strongly resent the way a 25 year old who only passed the bar exam by cheating has been parachuted to the front of the queue and are chuntering threateningly.

Basil

Basil RajapaskeBasil is apparently the most intelligent, the most sensitive and the most moderate of the brothers. He does not have much competition when it comes to the second and third of these qualities and he is hardly what you would call a soft touch – as his iron rule of northern Sri Lanka will testify.

He is the minister for economic development which makes him the number two in the Sri Lankan Treasury, and since the number one is Mahinda this gives him a considerable say on economic policy. He was Mahinda’s election campaign manager in 2010 and is his currently the official Presidential advisor. One of the obsessions of Sri Lankan politics geeks is the extent to which Basil is the Sri Lankan Karl Rove: is he Mahinda’s brain, or merely his envoy, patsy, and – at some future point – fall guy? The linked question of course is whether he will eventually replace Mahinda, and what damage his attempts to do so will do to his fraternal relations.

But whilst the extent of Basil’s role in the south is entirely unclear, what is clear is that Basil rules the former LTTE held areas – the Vanni – almost single-handedly. He does this as chair of the PTF: the President’s Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province. Although ostensibly not much more than a parliamentary sub-committee Mahinda has given it such wide ranging powers, and Basil has further encroached on others’ authority, that we are now at a stage where not a finger can be lifted in former Tiger-held areas without Basil personally authorising how high it can be lifted, and for what length of time it can remain raised. As a result much needed development work is drowning in micro-management and significant sums are simply being turned down if they don’t fit in with Basil’s plans. It is not yet clear what Basil’s plans are: some claim ethnic dilution with the best plots of land being parcelled off to Sinhalese newcomers. That isn’t proven and might be wide of the mark, but the creation of a heavily militarised north where all the most lucrative aspects of the tourist trade are run by the Army and Tamil political aspirations are strangled in red tape is clearly continuing apace.

Gotabhaya

Gota RajapaksaGota, as he is known to all, is a psychopath. In fact, one suicidally brave – if shrill  - journalist went even further saying it is his stupidity which leads to his insecurity which in turn leads to his brutality. Their article appears to have disappeared which is not surprising. In fact there is even less criticism of Gota than there is of Mahinda – for the very simple reason that if you criticize Gota you often end up dead or worse. Later, I am going to attempt to describe the rational equation that governs political violence and the attempt to control public space in Sri Lanka. What is clear is that that is only half the story, the other half is that Gota kills anyone who pisses him off. As a result there is a fair cannon of journalism at the moment criticising but not naming an individual close to the president – the reason is that that individual is Gota.

This is a classic example and is clearly about Gota. Whilst the tone is somewhat hysterical, this was not written by a ranting member of the diaspora but by a former SLFP minister and political fixer. The idea that Mahinda himself is scared of Gota and might one day come to the same end as Abel is actually quite common. Personally I find it quite unlikely given how tightly bound a unit the Rajapaksa family is and the fact that I’m pretty sure on some level Gota realises he needs his more acceptable and presentable brothers as a shield for his actions.

The other great Gota conspiracy theory is the extent to which Sri Lanka contains a “deep state” or a hidden parallel state run by Gota and his secret military hit squads. There is enough that is sinister and unsettling about Sri Lankan politics without engaging in conspiracy theory but what does seem to be the case is that the disappearances, torture and assassinations of dissidents and journalists do seem to be centrally co-ordinated in some way – and the finger of suspicion always seems to hover over Gota. And then there’s the small matter of everyone who criticizes him ending up dead. And the fact that he was in charge of the key brigades during the end of the civil war. Interestingly this may prove his undoing as Gota, like Basil, studied in America and, like Basil, took advantage of the opportunity to claim US citizenship while he was over there. So he may yet end his days in an American dock.

Gota’s actual role is often misunderstood. He is not actually the Defence Minister (that is Mahinda), nor is he the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Mahinda again – constitutionally it has to be). Often referred to as the Defence Secretary, he is actually the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Defence Ministry – in other words (in theory) a politically neutral civil servant, albeit the most senior one in the department, with no direct executive or political power. And if you believe that then you’ll believe anything.

How it works

I may have painted the brothers as monsters and that is because they are. But that is not the full story of how they rule.  They are very very popular, particularly Mahinda, and this is not just because they buy votes with development funding (though they do) or because they are benefiting from a post conflict boost (though they are).  There are many populist demagogues of whom the same can be said. What has become known as “the Sri Lanka model” is slightly more interesting than that – and whilst none of it is entirely new it is at least unusual.

Sri Lanka controls the media very tightly, but one could make a case for saying that other countries – such as Syria or pre-Tahrir Egypt – control their media far more tightly. Yet Sri Lanka has a far more favourable domestic press than Syria or pre-Tahrir Egypt. Fear and intimidation is part of it, nationalist populism another part, and apathy and conditioning born of the effectiveness of the program a considerable part. But for me the key is that they have a very successful narrative: that they and everyone else who agrees with them represents the people and everyone else represents the elite. They have been helped by the fact that there is a kernel of truth to this. With some far-sighted exceptions most who have raised the issue of free speech have not made much of an effort to engage with grassroots Sri Lankans; and most Sri Lankans have similarly not been far sighted enough to draw the line between civic human rights and economic human rights (although interestingly the new pension bill might be bridging that gap).

Managing the balance necessary to preserve this narrative is a matter of some skill: one must be brutal enough to cower your critics into silence but not so brutal as to make them feel they have nothing to lose or alienate the public. No one does this as well as Sri Lanka and that is why whilst there are regimes far more brutal than the Rajapaksas I’m not sure there are any so insidious. Brutal regimes who smash opponents are two a penny – what makes Sri Lanka unusual is the artistry and subtlety of its brutality. I fear this makes them worse rather than better: absolutist regimes leave people nowhere to go except into open revolt, and so rarely stand the test of time. The Sri Lankan model could prove more durable.

It also means that Sri Lanka is a country beset by shades of grey. In the same way that Sri Lanka is not a dictatorship because the Rajapaksas don’t need it to be, so it is not a country that prohibits free speech because it doesn’t have to. But while one can speak out, one needs to exercise great care when doing so and consider a delicate equation. To look at that equation, it is worth looking at the time someone – arguably the state – got it wrong, and at arguably the most extraordinary editorial any newspaper has ever published:

Lasantha Wickrematunge

In the mid 1980s two of the most fearsome human rights lawyers in Sri Lanka were Mahinda Rajapaksa and Lasantha Wickrematunge. They took the UNP government to court countless times over their treatment of JVP activists and they became firm friends as they did so. As Mahinda’s political career took off Lasantha – also an SLFP activist in his youth – went into journalism and often found himself criticising his former friend.

Lasantha ended up editing the Sunday Leader with his brother Lal. Refusing to compromise on the truth, the Sunday Leader became a constant thorn in the government’s side – laying bare corruption and nepotism and, most damagingly of all, doing what no other newspaper would dare and telling the truth about the war with the LTTE. Anti-tank shells were fired into Lasantha’s house, it was sprayed with machine gun fire, he was assaulted twice, but still he did not stop. Yet throughout Lasantha and Mahinda remained firm friends, in the word’s of the former:

“Hardly a month passes when we do not meet, privately or with a few close friends present, late at night at President’s House. There we swap yarns, discuss politics and joke about the good old days”

According to Lasantha himself this friendship took a break in January of 2006 when Mahinda rang him saying, ”F**k your mother, you son of a bloody whore! I will finish you! I treated you well all this while. Now I will destroy you. You don’t know who Mahinda Rajapaksa is. You watch what I will do to you!” It turned out Mahinda was angry about an article in the Morning Leader about the first lady which simply didn’t exist. Lasantha’s response was to say “Mahinda, just because you are President, do not talk in that threatening way. We don’t get intimidated by threats. Tell us what it is we are supposed to have written.” This did not calm the irate President who continued, “You are not scared! I will show you what it is to be scared. I will rest only once I have destroyed you. You wait and see. You don’t know who Mahinda Rajapakse is.” Lasantha’s response was the same as always: to publish the entire exchange in the newspaper, and their relationship hit rock bottom.

Yet they made up again within the year and continued tearing chunks out of each other in public and drinking together in private. Then in January of 2009 four motorbikes surrounded Lasantha’s car as he was on his way to work and four hitmen shot him dead. The next day the Leader published this editorial that Lasantha had written for publication in the event of his assasination, seemingly only days before. The first few paragraphs will give you goosebumps:

“No other profession calls on its practitioners to lay down their lives for their art save the armed forces and, in Sri Lanka, journalism. In the course of the past few years, the independent media have increasingly come under attack. Electronic and print-media institutions have been burnt, bombed, sealed and coerced. Countless journalists have been harassed, threatened and killed. It has been my honour to belong to all those categories and now especially the last.

I have been in the business of journalism a good long time. Indeed, 2009 will be The Sunday Leader’s 15th year. Many things have changed in Sri Lanka during that time, and it does not need me to tell you that the greater part of that change has been for the worse. We find ourselves in the midst of a civil war ruthlessly prosecuted by protagonists whose bloodlust knows no bounds. Terror, whether perpetrated by terrorists or the state, has become the order of the day. Indeed, murder has become the primary tool whereby the state seeks to control the organs of liberty. Today it is the journalists, tomorrow it will be the judges. For neither group have the risks ever been higher or the stakes lower.

Why then do we do it? I often wonder that. After all, I too am a husband, and the father of three wonderful children. I too have responsibilities and obligations that transcend my profession, be it the law or journalism. Is it worth the risk? Many people tell me it is not. Friends tell me to revert to the bar, and goodness knows it offers a better and safer livelihood. Others, including political leaders on both sides, have at various times sought to induce me to take to politics, going so far as to offer me ministries of my choice. Diplomats, recognising the risk journalists face in Sri Lanka, have offered me safe passage and the right of residence in their countries. Whatever else I may have been stuck for, I have not been stuck for choice.

But there is a calling that is yet above high office, fame, lucre and security. It is the call of conscience.”

And the rest is just as good.

There was outrage in response to his death, and further outrage in response to the 34 inconclusive attempts to open an investigation into it. There was talk that the eccentric SLFP MP Mervyn Silva (a man largely famous for tying civil servants to mango trees to “discipline them” and appearing on reality tv to swear at the judges) had admitted to his murder. Even today the controversy has not gone away. In a country where a BBC journalist was murdered with scarcely an eyelid batted, Lasantha’s killing still casts a long shadow.

The formula

Assassinations are of course just the tip of an iceberg of intimidation which starts with the sort of low level stuff I imagine will start appearing in the comments section of this piece, and goes through threatening phone calls, to midnight home visits, to abduction and torture. But the principle is that the state has to weigh up on the one hand how famous and/or protected the target is and thus how much of a stink they will cause dead. They then have to weigh up how vocal and – even more importantly – effective they are in their criticism and thus how much of a stink they are causing alive. If your killing causes more fuss than the things you say do then you live.

With Lasantha Wickrematunge it appears that they may have got the calculation wrong. It may be that his brilliant posthumous editorial severely increased the international news value of his death. It may be that an important extra factor to consider was Lasantha’s uniqueness: whilst there were other vocal critics of the Government no-one was really doing what the Leader was doing in highlighting the government’s conduct of the Civil War and, much as his brother Lal claimed that Lasantha’s death would only make them bolder, it has (understandably) resulted in the Leader moderating its tone. So the government may have considered the heat worth it to silence an irreplaceable critic.

And it may be of course that this was not a rational decision. Personal feelings of betrayal may have caused the President to have his Thomas à Becket moment. Or he may have angered Gota more than usual (Gota was suing him for libel over his coverage of the war at the time). Either way it could have caused a serious problem for the government – had there been any opposition.

The (non) opposition

The UNP are falling apart. Two times PM and former Presidential candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe is still leader despite being widely seen as unelectable. He has survived repeated leadership challenges and has changed his party’s rules to make himself more secure – as a result the party is widely seen as marching determinedly into the political wilderness. Meanwhile his party under Sajith Premadasa, the son of the former President, are in open revolt – a revolt no doubt in part stoked up from behind the scenes by the SLFP’s agents.

But the UNP do at least have a coherent identity – even if it is about to split into two. That puts them head and shoulders above most other opposition parties. The choice at the last Presidential election was not scintillating: on the one hand there was the war criminal/hero, autocrat, and architect of the civil war Mahinda Rajapaksa and on the other was err… the war criminal/hero, autocrat, and architect of the civil war Chief of Defence Staff Sarath Fonseka. Yet virtually every party fell into the trap of supporting one or t’other.

Those that backed Fonseka found themselves stranded when the coalition imploded after his defeat and arrest on war crimes charges just before the Parliamentary election (whilst clearly politically motivated this move could yet prove the Rajapaksa’s undoing – containing as it does the admission war crimes took place, that they should and can be prosecuted, and that the higher echelons of the command structure were involved). Those that backed Rajapaksa found themselves even more compromised - with the result that some of the strongest critics of the government: the JVP and the socialist SSP are now ensconced in ministerial posts and so silenced.

In the north there is a mixed picture. The TNA was the Sinn Fein to the LTTE’s IRA; with the LTTE gone it initially seemed leaderless and pointless and on its way towards oblivion. Yet despite the best efforts of the government the TNA managed a remarkable recovery and has now emerged as the genuine and independent voice of the majority of the Tamil north. That said what they haven’t yet done is worked out what they now stand for.

Meanwhile all executive power is exercised through Basil and the PTF or Gota and the military – but as they are loathed they are unable to put down political roots. The government’s solution is to turn to its Tamil allies: those members of the LTTE who rebelled and joined to the governmental side towards the latter stages of the war. There is the TVMP of Karuna (Colonel Karuna Amman – real name Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) whose split from the LTTE delivered the east to the Government, and the EPDP of Douglas Devananda. The problem with their groups is that they are viewed as war criminals and traitors by both sides – a composite of all the sins of the LTTE and all the sins of the Sri Lankan Government. That the Sri Lankan government chooses for the moment to defend them, and thus by extension the LTTE, may eventually come back to bite them; in the meantime it does nothing for their popularity. And so the TVMP and EPDP attempt to control the population the way the LTTE did – through fear. But with the LTTE and all associated with them so reviled and discredited in Tamil eyes (if not yet all of the diaspora, who haven’t quite caught up) that doesn’t really fly either.

Depressed? You should be. Here’s Kumar Sangakkara singing the backstreet boys. Really:








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